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ABSTRACT 
 
Gambling can be divided into activities of chance (e.g. gaming machines) or skill (e.g. sports 
betting). With the rise of sports betting over recent years, treatment services are now facing 
increasing proportions of people with problems related to sports-betting or other related skill-
based activities. However, many existing cognitive therapy approaches to gambling are 
largely focused on addressing false beliefs about chance and randomness, which may not be 
translatable to skill-based forms of gambling. Problem gamblers are more likely to endorse a 
range of gambling-related erroneous beliefs when compared to regular gamblers, which 
contributes to persistent problem gambling. Previous research has found that higher levels of 
irrationality are not attributable to low understanding of objective odds or numerical 
reasoning skill. It is proposed that skill-based betting may be maintained and driven by a 
wider range of cognitive beliefs relating to skill in gambling. The present study examined 
gambling-related and skill-related erroneous beliefs and numerical reasoning skills of 
problem gamblers, non-problem regular gamblers, skill-based gamblers and chance-based 
gamblers. Results showed that problem gamblers endorse more erroneous and skill-related 
beliefs than non-problem gamblers, and skill-based gamblers endorse more cognitions 
relating to skill than chance-based cognitions. Results confirmed previous findings that 
problem and non-problem gamblers do not differ significantly in their understanding of 
gambling odds, and that differences in numerical reasoning does not explain cognitive beliefs 
of skill in skill-based gamblers. Skill-based problem gamblers were most likely to score 
highest on skill-related cognitions. Implications of this research are discussed in relation to 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Gambling in Australia 
Problem gambling remains an ongoing and growing social concern in Australia, 
particularly due to the rising availability and involvement of online gambling and in 
particular, sport betting. It is estimated that up to 1% of Australian are problem gamblers, and 
an additional 1.4 to 2.1% are classified as “at risk” (Productivity Comission, 2010). The 
culture of gambling is ever changing due to the increasing ease of access to different types of 
physical and online gambling platforms, including a multitude of websites and applications 
accessible at the fingertips of gamblers (Gooding & Tarrier, 2009). 
 
Gambling remains an ongoing social concern in Australia, with total gambling 
expenditure for 2016-2017 standing at $23.648 billion, (Queensland Government 
Statistician's Office, 2018). Since 1999, participation rates for all gambling types have 
decreased, except for sports betting, and race betting has had the smallest decrease, 
(Gainsbury, 2013). This increase in sports betting is believed to be the result of increased 
availability, modes and formats of gambling, when compared to traditional land-based 
options. Sports betting, which is currently the only and fastest growing form of gambling in 
Australia, experienced a 15.3% increase in expenditure from 2016-2016, (Queensland 
Government Statistician's Office, 2018) and was the only form of gambling that saw an 
increase in participation rates (Gainsbury, Russell, Hing, Wood, Lubman, & Blaszczynski, 
2013).  
 
Problem gambling is thought to be maintained by an increased dedication of time and 
money to gambling which can result in adverse consequences to the person, their support 
network and the wider community, (Dickerson, McMillen, Hallebone, Volberg, & Woolley, 
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1997; Neal, Delfabbro, & O'Neil, 2005). Numerous theories have been advanced over the last 
50 years to explain and understand problem gambling. These include approaches involving 
operant and classical conditioning, models of addiction originating from the DSM-V, 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013), and models explained by neurophysiology 
(Griffiths & Delfabbro, 2001). However, a focus of this thesis will be upon explanations 
arising from the field of cognitive psychology, which suggest that problem gambling is 
maintained by persistent, irrational or erroneous cognitive beliefs held by gamblers.   
 
As will be discussed, cognitive theory suggests that gamblers often do not understand 
the true nature of gambling. Many over-estimate the amount of skill that can be applied to 
influence the outcomes or they do not understand the nature of chance and randomness. Such 
cognitions can lead to an over-estimation of the ability to win at gambling and may lead to 
people persisting with activities which have an inevitable negative return to the player.  These 
observations have led to the development of cognitive therapies that focus on drawing the 
gambler’s attention to the chance nature of activities and the limited extent to which skill can 
be applied (Gooding & Tarrier, 2009; Ladouceur et al., 2003; Ladouceur & Sylvain, 
1999;Tarrier, 2011; Walker, 1992). Although results from cognitive and behavioural therapy 
have been promising, a challenge is that gambling activities are not all the same. Instead, they 
can be divided into two categories: gambling activities of chance (such as electronic gaming 
machines, pokies, lottery products and casino table games) and activities involving an 
element of skill (such as sports betting, horse racing and card games). Thus, while it may 
make sense to draw attention to the lack of skill that might be applied in the chance-based 
activities, it becomes more complex when activities contain elements of genuine skill.  
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The aim of the following review is to examine the nature of cognitive approaches to 
the study of gambling and problem gambling and the issues that arise when trying to study 
skill as opposed to chance-based activities. Central to this analysis is the extent to which: (a) 
problem gamblers appear more prone to erroneous beliefs and whether this reflects poorer 
numerical reasoning or knowledge about gambling; and (b) whether people’s preferences for 
skill as opposed to chance-based gambling may influence how cognitive factors must be 
approached in problem gambling.   
 
1.2 Cognitive processing and Erroneous Beliefs in Gambling 
Problem gamblers find it challenging to cease their gambling habits despite 
significant financial losses and additional adverse social, psychological and occupational 
consequences (Ladouceur, 2004; Toneatto et al., 1997; Toplak et al., 2007). A significant 
body of research demonstrates that cognition and irrational beliefs appear to play an 
important role in the development and maintenance problem gambling. Cognitive beliefs that 
may sustain problem gambling include attitudes concerning control, irrational beliefs of 
control over outcomes, prediction, luck and chance (Toneatto, 1999). It is understood that 
gamblers may develop a perception that outcomes can be controlled and predicted, rather 
than determined by chance (Barrault & Varescon, 2013). Literature suggests that these 
cognitive distortions, also known as erroneous irrational beliefs, are related to, and possibly 
the cause, of persistent gambling. Studies have typically shown that problem gamblers, when 
compared to regular non-problem gamblers, are more likely to endorse a wider range of 
erroneous beliefs, such as beliefs about control or predictability of outcomes, as well as 
express stronger beliefs in their endorsements (Ladouceur, 2004; Sevigny & Ladouceur, 
2004).  In particular, previous research (e.g., Toneatto, 1999) suggests that pathological 
gamblers are more likely to fall victim to several gambling tendencies, including the illusion 
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of control (Langer, 1975; Thompson, Thomas, & Armstrong, 1998), skill misperceptions, 
skewed temporal orientation, the gambler’s fallacy (Tversky & Kahnaman, 1971), selective 
memory, superstitious beliefs, availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973; Wagenaar, 
1998); biased attributions (Gilovich, 1983; Gilovich & Douglas, 1986) beliefs about the role 
of luck (Griffiths, 1994) and interpretative biases.  
 
The concepts of cognitive processing and irrational beliefs in pathological gamblers 
was discussed in depth by Toplak et al. (2007). Toplak et al. (2007) investigated numerous 
domains of cognitive, motivational and affective control across three sample groups: 
pathological gamblers, non-pathological gamblers and individuals without gambling 
problems. They argued that cognitive processing can be separated into two types: analytical 
processing, which is a slower, methodical, more critical form of processing incoming 
information, and the autonomous set of systems, which are automatic, fast, implicit and 
mostly unconscious systems of processing stimuli. These systems can consist of well-
learned associations and processing that have developed through patterns of behaviour. The 
same information is processed by each system; however, in situations where poor decisions 
are made, what is known as adaptive processing occurs in which the automatic system is 
overridden by the analytical system.  The authors explained that ‘system failures’ occur in 
situations where the analytical system fails to identify and correct errors integral to the 
automatic interpretation of information. Failures of this type are believed to be common in 
problem gambling. It is thought that these failures result from a range of factors such as the 
high levels of reinforcement that gambling provides, the impulsivity of gamblers, which is 
caused by a lack of reflection by the gambler when making decisions, or lastly, learned 
inappropriate associations or rules from previous gambling practices, such as illusions of 
control or gambler’s fallacy beliefs, which perhaps is due to the occurrence of selective 
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processing of information. Interference from emotional or motivational processes means 
the analytical part of the brain has no ability to stop the activation of automatic processes. 
Therefore, as Toplak et al. (2007) explained, “some mindware [i.e., cognitive too ls or 
strategies] can be the direct cause of irrational actions that… can serve to maintain 
pathological gambling behaviour.” (p. 107). In their research, which comprised 107 
gamblers, Toplak et al (2007) found that pathological gamblers were more susceptible to 
cognitive biases, such as, the gambler’s fallacy, probability matching, perceptions of 
superstitious control, and other similar erroneous strategies.     
 
1.3 Skill and Chance-Based Gambling Activities 
Chance-based gambling activities are considered games in which skill or knowledge 
have no influence on outcomes and where outcomes are random and beyond the control of 
the gambler. In contrast, in skill-based gambling activities, skill or knowledge can influence 
the outcome or predicted outcome. In general, while many studies have revealed high levels 
of erroneous beliefs in gamblers and problem gamblers in particular (e.g., Delfabbro & 
Winefield, 2000; Griffiths M. , 1995; Walker, 1992a) some studies have shown that it may 
also be important to examine the type of gambler.  Toneatto et al. (1997) found that higher 
levels of cognitive distortions were associated with games which potentially involved an 
element of skill, such as sports or cards, than games that involved no skill. This level of 
irrationality regarding control of the game may be the result of skilled gamblers believing 
that knowledge can positively impact the outcome of the game. They concluded that these 
erroneous beliefs not only explain why gamblers persevere even in situations where they are 
suffering a financial detriment, but also indicate that the added element of skill can generate a 
greater irrational sense of control over the game, which subsequently may result in gamblers 
developing financial and negative consequences.  
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Similar findings were obtained by Myrseth et al. (2010) who found differing levels of 
illusion of control depending on preference for game type (i.e. skill/chance) and gambling 
severity (i.e. pathological or non-pathological). Gamblers with a preference for skill games or 
a combination of skill and chance games, showed higher levels of illusion of control when 
compared to those who preferred only chance games. This was attributed to Langer’s (1975) 
theory of illusion of control, where gamblers with a preference for skilled games were 
overconfident in their individual skills, and an illusion of control created an excessive 
expectation of favoured results. Myrseth et al. (2010) argued that  “there is an element of 
chance in almost any skill situation and vice versa, and the lack of discrimination between 
controllable and uncontrollable events is attributable to the fact that skill and chance factors 
are so closely related” (p. 566).  This is further supported by Cantinotti et al. (2004), who 
suggested that information received and relied on during betting only strengthens one’s 
illusion of control and perceived expertise.  
 
However, there is limited existing research that extends beyond the illusion of control 
and examines the extent to which erroneous beliefs of gamblers with a preference for skill 
differ to those with a preference for chance games. With the recent rise of online sports 
betting, further research is needed to better understand the nature of this association and to 
contribute to the understanding of the effect of emerging sports and skilled betting 
technologies. 
 
1.4 Perceived or Actual Expertise in Skill-Based Gambling 
It has been found that irrational perceptions in gambling are more common than 
accurate perceptions, irrespective of whether the individual believed the game to be 
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determined on skill or chance, (Gaboury & Ladouceur, 1989). Previous literature has 
discussed whether higher levels of cognitive distortions regarding the controllability of 
outcomes in skill-based gamblers, reflect perceived or actual expertise, that is, an illusion or 
actual control over the game (Cantinotti, Ladouceur, & Jacques, 2004; Ladouceur, Giroux, & 
Jacques, 1998; Myrseth, Brunborg & Eidem, 2010). Existing research on this has mixed 
findings. Research has shown that knowledge about the game and betting skills can be 
advantageous and valuable in sports betting (Burger, 1991; Rogers, 1998; Turner & Fritz, 
2001). Studies have also found that in skill-based gambling, players can make money if they 
have better information and knowledge than other players (Turner & Barry, 2001).  
 
However, other studies have suggested there is significant confusion between chance 
and skill in sports betting, and have proposed that knowledge and skills do not benefit the 
gambler’s wins on horseracing (Ladouceur et al., 1998) or sports betting (Cantinotti et al., 
2004). In these studies, it was suggested that sports bettors’ skills are manifested by the 
gambler’s cognitive distortions and are not genuine skills (Cantinotti., et al 2004). In a study 
by Ladouceur et al. (1998), it was found that expert bettors on horse-racing had strong 
erroneous beliefs regarding their ability to predict outcomes more accurately than chance. 
Their research showed that information and statistics regarding the strengths and weaknesses 
of horses did not result in more success, and rather, it was manifested by the gambler’s 
illusion of control, (Cantinotti et al., 2004; Ladouceur et al., 1998). When people make 
decisions, engage in continuous involvement, and gain game knowledge, beliefs in personal 
control rise. In the field of skill-based gambling, previous research has attributed 
overconfidence and hopeful expectations of winning to the theory of illusion of control, 
(Langer 1975; Myrseth et al., 2010).  
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An element that has not received any attention in existing research regarding the 
actual skill of problem gamblers who participate in skill-based activities, is whether those 
who gamble on skilled games possess better numerical reasoning or understanding of 
gambling odds than those who gamble on chance.  
 
1.5 Numerical Reasoning and Knowledge of Odds  
Previous research suggests that problem gamblers who prefer skill games score higher 
on illusion of control than those who prefer chance, and therefore they overestimate their 
control over winning (Myrseth et al., 2010).  However, previous research has shown that not 
all results are in the direction expected. For example, knowledge of gambling odds does not 
appear to differ between problem and non-problem gamblers (Lambos & Delfabbro, 2007) as 
might be expected by those who attribute erroneous beliefs to a lack of knowledge about 
gambling. Similarly, somewhat counter intuitively, gamblers and regular non-problem 
gamblers generally do not always differ in terms of their numerical reasoning skills (Lambos 
& Delfabbro, 2007). These findings are supported by other studies which show that decision-
making quality does not always differ between strategic (skill-based) and non-strategic 
(chance-based) gamblers (Grant et al., 2012) and that having a better knowledge in 
probability and statistics does not necessarily make people more resistant to developing 
erroneous perceptions (Benhsain & Ladouceur, 2004). Similarly, a study by (Delfabbro, 
Lahn, & Grabosky, 2006) found that young problem gamblers responded more accurately to 
objective odds (e.g., the likelihood of certain outcomes in a coin toss), even though they over-
estimated the skill level involved in activities based on chance.  Delfabbro et al., (2006) 
argued that this demonstrated that differences in knowledge of odds or numerical reasoning 
skill might not be the foundation of cognitive reasoning differences between problem and 
non-problem gamblers.  
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Prior to this research, it was assumed that irrational thinking in a gambling context 
was linked to lack of mathematical and statistical knowledge, and that reducing problem 
gambling could be achieved by informing gamblers about the realistic odds of gambling, 
(Lambos & Delfabbro, 2007). However, this earlier work did not focus on the type of 
gambler. If problem gamblers are more likely to gamble on a wider range of activities 
including more skill-based activities, it may be that this explains some of the difference in the 
cognitions endorsed (e.g., they may have a reason to report skill in their gambling).  
 
1.6 Current Approach to Gambling Therapy  
Cognitive and cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) methods are integral to the 
treatment of addiction (Kouimtsidis, Reynolds, Drummond, Davis, & Tarrier, 2007), and 
CBT is recognised as the practice strategy with the most empirical support in the field of 
problem gambling (Petry, 2005; Walker, 1992). Most cognitive therapy approaches to 
gambling are centred around an assumption that beliefs are erroneous or irrational, (Tarrier, 
2011), and these beliefs are the reason problematic behaviour is ongoing and maintained. 
Current cognitive therapy interventions for problem gambling target unhelpful patterns of 
thinking relating to gambling, particularly challenging irrational views relating to chance, 
randomness and probabilities. These approaches stem from earlier work in the field of 
anxiety and depression (Beck, 1997; Ellis, 1962). A substantial body of research now 
supports the primary assumptions central to cognitive approaches, most of which relate to 
control over chance-based outcomes and probability. It is suggested that if these erroneous 
beliefs are identified and subsequently challenged, discredited or corrected, this will then 
encourage and empower more suitable and effective decisions, which subsequently reduces 
harms related to gambling behaviour, (Walker, 1992). Furthermore, approaches that 
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challenge these beliefs have been found to reduce overall symptoms of problem gambling 
(Gooding & Tarrier, 2009; Ladouceur et al., 2003; Ladouceur & Sylvain, 1999).  
 
With the rise of accessibility and use of online sports betting in recent years, treatment 
services are now faced with an increasing proportion of people with problems related to 
sports-betting and other skill based gambling activities. A challenge is that many existing 
cognitive approaches to gambling therapy are largely focused on addressing maladaptive 
patterns of thinking, particularly false beliefs about chance and randomness and control over 
chance-based outcomes. However, despite the fact that both types of gambling are similar in 
structure, one must question the suitability of a focus on erroneous beliefs, chance and 
probabilities for skill-based gambling activities, and whether the current cognitive strategies 
are translatable to forms of gambling that involve an element of skill. 
 
Unlike chance-based gambling activities, gambling activities such as sports betting, 
horse racing and card games arguably involve an association between player strategy or 
decision and outcomes. Unlike chance based gambling, which is thought to be sustained by 
irrational beliefs of long-term profitability, skill-based gambling may be maintained by 
consistent over estimation of skills. Actions taken by skilled gamblers can be considered 
deterministic, which is, that a player’s input and decision-making can determine outcomes. 
Furthermore, there may be an assumption if one perseveres using one’s skill in the correct 
way for long enough, the gambler will be rewarded.  
 
It is therefore proposed that sports and more skill-based betting are likely to be 
maintained and driven by a wider or different range of cognitive beliefs, and hence, it may 
not be effective to continue to apply chance-based approaches relating to skill and 
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randomness with this group. It may be the incorrect approach to tell problem gamblers that 
there is ‘no skill involved’ or “it is all random”. As there might be a real element of skill 
involved in skill-based gambling, cognitive approaches currently used for gambling might 
not be generalised to skilled gamblers. Due to the fact that gambling severity is traditionally 
associated with level of irrational cognitive beliefs, addressing these cognitive beliefs is a 
critical step to overcoming problem gambling. Therefore, it is necessary, in research and in 
practice, to reassess the relevant cognitive factors involved in the preservation of behaviours 
in gambling games of skill, and whether there are separate cognitive reasoning processes 
from what is seen in chance-based games that may contribute to ongoing and maladaptive 
gambling behaviour.   
 
1.7 The Present Study 
This study builds upon the earlier work of Lambos et al. (2007), which examined 
whether differences in numerical reasoning or knowledge of odds might explain the greater 
endorsement of erroneous beliefs by problem gamblers. In this study, this work is extended 
by including comparisons of skill and chance based gamblers (both problem and non-
problem gamblers) and also a wider range of dysfunctional beliefs that might be more 
suitable to explain persistent gambling on skill-based activities. The study will utilise a 2 
Gambler group (Problem and non-Problem) x 2 Skill / Chance Activity Preference factorial 
design to investigate the following hypotheses:  
 
1. Problem gamblers will endorse more erroneous beliefs than non-problem regular 
gamblers on standardised measures. 
2. Problem gamblers will endorse more cognitions relating to the use of skilful play than 
non-problem regular gamblers. 
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3. There will be no significant difference between problem gamblers and non-problem 
regular gamblers in their knowledge of gambling odds or numerical reasoning skills 
(as based on the previous study by Lambos et al. (2007).  
4. Gamblers with a preference for skilled games will score higher on numerical 
reasoning than gamblers with a preference for chance games. 
5. Gamblers with a preference for skilled games will score higher on broader skill-based 
cognitions than gamblers with a preference for chance games.  
6. Problem gamblers with a preference for skilled games will score highest of all four 
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CHAPTER TWO: METHOD 
2.1 Participants 
A total of 152 participants (99 male, 53 female) who ranged in age from 20 to 80 
years in age (M = 53.31, SD = 15.91) participated in the study. Participants had to be over 18 
years of age, (i.e. above the legal age for Gambling in South Australia) and fluent in English. 
Participants were included if they classified as a problem or non-problem gambler on the 
Problem Gambling Severity Index (‘PGSI’). Participants were classified as problem gamblers 
if they had a score of 8 or above on the Problem Gambling Severity Index, which indicates 
problem gambling with negative consequences and a possible loss of control. Participants 
were classified as non-problem, regular gamblers if they gambled fortnightly, and scored 
between 0 and 2 on the PGSI. This score indicates non-problem or low levels of problems 
with few or no identified negative consequences. The study involved four sample groups: 
problem gamblers with a preference for skill-based gambling activities (n = 23); problem 
gamblers with a preference for chance-based gambling activities (n = 26); non-problem 
regular gamblers with a preference for skill-based gambling activities (n = 44) and non-
problem regular gamblers with a preference for chance-based gambling activities (n = 59). 
Participants were recruited from two sources.  
 
2.2 Sampling and Survey Procedure  
Eligible participants who classified as problem gamblers per the PGSI (i.e. scores of 8 
and above), were initially sourced from PsychMed Pty Ltd, a private psychology clinic that is 
the current provider of the South Australian Intensive Gambling Help Service. These 
participants were invited to participate via email and post (Appensix B), which provided a 
URL to the online survey. An additional sample of problem gamblers and a sample of non-
problem, regular gamblers were recruited from the community, using an online panel 
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recruitment service, Qualtrics. Qualtrics sourced participants who gambled at least fortnightly 
and scored between 0-2 or over 8 on the PGSI. All data were collected using an online survey 




2.3.1 Demographics, Gambling Frequency and Preference 
Firstly, demographic information (age and gender), were obtained from the 
participant. Participants were asked if they had gambled in the last two weeks and how often 
they gambled in the last 12 months (Once a day, 2-3 times a week, once a week, once a 
fortnight, once a month, less than once a month). Participants were then asked about the type 
of gambling they most frequently engaged in over the last 12 months, the type of gambling 
activity they spent the most money on in the last 12 months, and their gambling frequency 
and involvement in the following categories: horse/greyhound racing, sports betting, 
gambling machines, casino table games, card games, lottery products, keno, internet 
gambling or private gambling.  
 
2.3.2 Problem Gambling Severity Index (PGSI) 
The PGSI is a self-report measure which features nine items, four that measure 
problem gambling behaviours (e.g. How often have bet more than your could afford to lose?) 
and five that measure adverse gambling consequences (e.g. How often have you felt you 
might have a problem with gambling?) (Ferris, Wynne, & Single, 1999). Participants answer 
on a four-point Likert-style scale (0 = never, 1 = sometimes, 2 = most of the time, 3 = almost 
always), with an overall score ranging between 0 and 27. The PGSI was used to assess 
gambling severity, and to distinguish between problem and non-problem gamblers.   
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2.3.3 Gambling Related Cognitions Scale  
The Gambling Related Cognitions Scale is an indicator of gambling related cognitions 
and is a positive predictor of problem gambling, (Raylu & Oei, 2004). It measures gambling 
expectancies, illusion of control, predictive control, inability to stop gambling and 
interpretive bias. The higher total score indicates a higher number of gambling related 
cognitions for the participant. It is a self-report measure consisting of 22 items, which are 
rated on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).  
 
2.3.4 Skill Based Gambling Cognitions 
 
Internet Gaming Cognition Scale  
 
The Internet Gaming Cognition Scale is a 24-item self-report measure that assesses 
problematic cognitions relating to Internet Gaming Disorder, (King & Delfabbro, 2014; King 
& Delfabbro, 2016). Many elements of internet gaming addictions cross over with gambling 
habits, especially in relation to internet games that involve skill. Eleven items of this scale 
were selected on their capacity to assess skill-based cognitions and adapted to reflect beliefs 
about involvement of skill in gambling. For example, an item that read, “I spend time 
planning or thinking about video-games when I am not playing” was modified to, “I spend 
time planning or thinking about gambling when I am not gambling”. Items were rated on a 3-
point Likert scale (0 = Do Not Agree, 1 = Agree, 2 = Strongly Agree).  
 
Gambling Cognitions Inventory  
 
The Gambling Cognitions Inventory is a 33-item self-report measure that measures 
cognitive distortions that are typically related to etiological factors in problem gambling, 
(McInnes, Hodgins, & Holub, 2014). 5 items of the Gambling Cognitions Inventory were 
selected on their skill-based properties, for example, “I am a very skilled gambler” and “I am 
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very confident about my gambling ability”. Items were rated on a 4-point Likert scale ranging 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree).  
 
2.3.5 Knowledge of Gambling Related Odds  
Participants were asked four questions concerning common gambling related odds. 
All questions had five options, with one being correct or closest to the correct answer.  These 
questions were previously developed and used in Lambos & Delfabbro’s (2007) research, and 
tested respondents’ understanding of the odds relating to common gambling activities. 
Firstly, participants were asked to select the set of odds that was most likely associated with 
winning the lottery, with 6 numbers being correct out of 45. Answers ranged from 1 in 
100,000 to 1 in 10 million, with the most correct answer being 1 in 8 million. Participants 
were then asked, if two coins were tossed, what the chances are of getting two heads. 
Answers ranged from 10% to 50%, with the correct answer being 25%. A third question 
asked participants, if a poker machine returned 87% to the player and a person plays $20, 
how much would the player expect to lose. The correct answer was $2.60. Lastly, participants 
were asked the likelihood of drawing an ace from a deck of 52 cards. Answers included 1 in 
52, 2 in 52, 2 in 26 or none of the above, with the correct answer being 4 in 52.   
 
2.3.6 Numerical Reasoning Ability 
Participants completed two tests that measured their numerical reasoning skills: the 
Psytech International GRT2 General Reasoning Test (Psytech International, 1991) and the 
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Psytech International GRT2 General Reasoning Test  
The numerical section of the General Reasoning Test is a standardised test that 
measured participants’ understanding of numbers and relationships between numbers, and 
their “ability to use and manipulate numbers in a logical way”, (Psytech International, 1991). 
This particular test has been found to have strong psychometric properties and has been 
validated extensively across national and international samples. The test begins with 3 
example questions before completing 25 assessed questions, with each question containing 6 
possible answers. Questions include, “1, 2, 4, 7, 11, 16,… What number comes next?” with 
possible answers, “18, 24, 23, 19, 22 or 21”. The test stipulates that the 25 questions should 
be timed and completed within 10 minutes. Unfortunately, the software used did not allow 
for timed sections, so participants were advised to aim to complete the test within the 
specified time frame.  
 
Cognitive Reflection Test 
 
The Cognitive Reflection Test is a 3 item self-report measure is designed to capture a 
person’s tendency to override an initial incorrect response and employ further reflection that 
results in the correct answer, (Frederick, 2005). The first question is as follows, “A bat and a 
ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?”. 
The test has strong correlations with measures of thinking, including numerical thinking, 
(Szaszi, Szollosi, Palfi, & Aczel, 2017).  
 
2.4 Procedure  
Problem and regular non-problem regular gamblers participated in an online survey 
containing eight measures (Appendix A). Problem gamblers sourced from PsychMed were 
invited to participate via email and post (Appendix B). This invitation contained a brief 
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description of the study and an invitation for the recipient to participate. It included a link to 
the online survey on SurveyMonkey, where they were directed to the Participant Information 
Sheet as a prelude to entering the survey (Appendix C). Participants were asked to read the 
Information Sheet thoroughly and provide consent to partake in the study by clicking a check 
box (Appendix D). With consent from the participant, previous data collected from 
PsychMed was obtained, including participant demographics and results on the PGSI. As 
compensation for their time and effort, PsychMed problem gamblers provided an email or 
postal address at the end of the survey, to receive a Myer voucher to the value of $20.00, 
which was non-redeemable for cash. Participants had the opportunity to provide an email 
address to receive feedback via a copy of the final report.  
 
An additional sample of problem gamblers and non-problem regular gamblers were sourced 
via an online panel service, Qualtrics. Participants were invited to participant if they gambled 
fortnightly and classified as a problem gambler or non-problem regular gambler per the 
PGSI. These participants were also provided the Participant Information Sheet (Appendix C) 
and agreed to the Consent Form (Appendix D) prior to beginning the survey. Qualtrics 
participants were compensated via Qualtrics after survey completion. Due to confidentiality 
agreements, Qualtrics participants could not nominate an email address to receive feedback. 
The study was accessible from a personal or public device and took approximately 15 
minutes to complete.  
 
2.5 Ethics 
This project was approved by the University of Adelaide’s Human Research Ethics 
Committee and PsychMed Pty Ltd’s Ethics Committee. Consent was obtained from each 
participant via an online consent form (Appendix D). Participants were asked to answer 
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questions regarding their thoughts about their own gambling habits and experiences. Any 
risks of psychological discomfort for participants were mitigated by the supply of support 
phone numbers at the beginning and completion of the survey. For South Australian 
participants, PsychMed’s South Australian Intensive Gambling Help Service helpline was 
also be offered, and if eligible, participants were able to access further gambling services free 
of charge if needed. The questions contained in the measures were predominately centred on 
the participants’ general views towards their gambling rather than gambling experiences or 
any personal losses (Appendix A), which minimised the risk of discomfort. Privacy and 
confidentiality was protected by removing personal identifiers and replacing with coded data. 
Financial support for data collection was provided by the principal supervisor and no 
Honours budget was used. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESULTS 
 
3.1 Preliminary Analyses and Statistical Procedures 
Preliminary analyses that consisted of screening the data for outliers and testing that 
the data was suitable for parametric testing was conducted before commencing analyses. 
Through examination of histograms, normality plots and box plots, three scores on the PGSI, 
1 score on the GRCS and 1 score on the IGCS were identified as outliers. It was found the 3 
outliers on the PGSI did not have a significant effect on results, so they were included in the 
final analysis. The two outliers on the GRCS and IGCS were removed from the data set. 
 
Analyses included exploring descriptive statistics for demographics and measures, as 
well as a series of chi-squared analyses to test the relationship between the main categorical 
variables: gambler status, gender and gambling type. A number of t-tests were then 
performed to test the main effects of gender on outcome measures. This was followed by a 
series of 2 x 2 Analysis of variance (ANOVA) to test the main effects and interactions 
between gambling status (gambling group) and gambling preference (skill/chance activities) 
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3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
3.2.1 Demographics 
As seen in Table 3.1, 49 (32.2%) participants classified as problem gamblers (‘PG’) 
per the PGSI and 103 (67.8%) participants classified as non-problem regular gamblers 
(‘NPG’) who gambled at least fortnightly. Sixty-seven (44.1%) participants gambled 
predominantly on skill-based gambling activities and 85 (55.9%) gambled mostly on chance-
based gambling activities.  
 
Table 3.1   













Problem Gambling  
Status 
NPG 59 44 103 













As shown in Table 3.2, Lottery products were the most commonly reported gambling 
activity, followed by horse/greyhound racing, gaming machines, sports betting, and Keno. 
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Table 3.2 


















































Casino Table Games 
 






































* p < .05 
 
3.2.2 Gambler Status, Gender and Gambling Participation   
A series of 2 x 2 chi-square tests of independence were conducted to examine 
associations between categorical variables (gambler group, type of gambling and gender). 
Results showed that the relationship between problem gambler status and type of gambling 
(i.e. skill or chance) was non-significant, χ2 (1, N = 152) < 1 (V = .04). Table 3.2 shows chi-
square values for participation in each activity and gambler status, which indicates that only 
casino table games, χ2 (1, N = 152) = 4.26, p = .04, (V = .17), and lottery products, χ2 (1, N = 
152) = 9.18, p  <.05 (V = .25), were significantly associated with gambler status.  
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Three chi-square analyses were used to assess if associations existed between gender 
and gambler status, and gender and preference for skill or chance games. There was a non-
significant association between gender and problem gambling status, χ 2 (1, N = 152) = 2.21, 
p = .14, (V = .12), and a significant association between gender and preference for skill or 
chance games, χ 2 (1, N = 152) = 15.17, p  < .001, (V = .32).  
 
Table 3.3 
Number of female and male skill and chance-based gamblers. 
 
Independent samples t-tests were used to compare male and female means on 
outcome measures, and whether any differences were significant. As seen in Table 3.4, males 
scored slightly higher than females on the PGSI, IGCS and CRT, but these differences were 
non-significant. Males scored significantly higher on the GRCS, GCI, knowledge of odds and 
numerical reasoning tests. All effect sizes were medium according to Cohen’s d: GRCS (.38), 
knowledge of odds (.39) and numerical reasoning (.42), and a medium to large effect size for 
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Table 3.4  
 
Gender differences for the principal psychometric measures.   
 _______________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
PGSI = Problem Gambling Severity Index; GRCS = Erroneous Cognitions; IGCS; Skill-Related Cognitions, 
CGI: Skill-Related Cognitions; CRT = Cognitive Reasoning Test  
  
 Male 














































































































CRT .70(.94) .45(.77) 1.62 .29 
 
.11 
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3.2.3 Correlations 
 
Table 3.5 shows Pearson correlations between outcomes measures and gender. 
Increases in PGSI scores were significant correlated with increases in GRCS, IGCS, GCI and 
CRT scores. Increases in PGSI had a significant negative correlation with numerical 
reasoning scores. Significant positive correlations were also found between GRCS scores and 
IGCS and GCI scores. Significant negative correlations were found between GRCS scores 
and numerical reasoning scores. IGCS scores and GCI scores were significantly positively 
correlated, and IGCS scores had a significant negative correlation with numerical reasoning 
and CRT scores. Knowledge of odds scores had significant positive correlations with 
numerical reasoning and CRT scores, and numerical reasoning and CRT scores were 
significantly positively correlated. Gender had significant negative correlations with scores 
on the GRCS, GCI, knowledge of odds and numerical reasoning.  
  
  34 
 
Table 3.5 
Pearson correlations between measures. 
______________________________________________________________________   





PGSI        
GRCS .71**       
IGCS .73** .83**      
GCI .432** .73** .80**     
Knowledge 
of Odds 
-.01 .02 .06 .11    
Numerical 
Reasoning 
-.25** -.21* -.24** -.10 .53**   
CRT .18* -.12 -.18* -.06 .49** .59**  
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
PGSI = Problem Gambling Severity Index; GRCS = Erroneous Cognitions; IGCS; Skill-Related Cognitions, 
CGI: Skill-Related Cognitions; CRT = Cognitive Reasoning Test  
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3.3 Two-way Factorial ANOVA 
A 2 Gambling Preference (Skill/Chance) x 2 Gambler Group (PG/NPG) factorial 
ANOVA was run to determine the main effects of problem gambling status (gambling 
group/severity) and gambling preference (skill or chance-based activities) on outcome 
measures. These analyses also determined if problem gambling status and gambling 
preference had a significant interaction effect on outcome measures.  
  
3.3.1 GRCS Scores 
A two-way ANOVA was conducted to determine if there was an interaction between 
problem gambling status and skilled gambling preference on general gambling cognitions 
(GRCS). As shown in Table 3.6, problem gamblers endorsed more erroneous beliefs than 
non-problem regular gamblers, and there was a significant main effect of problem gambling 
status on GRCS scores, F (1, 148) = 145.87, p < .001. This supported the first hypothesis that 
problem gamblers would endorse more erroneous beliefs than non-problem regular gamblers. 
There was a significant main effect of gambling preference on GRCS scores, F (1, 148) = 
5.30, p = .02, and a non-significant interaction between problem gambling status and 
gambling preference on GRCS scores, F (1, 148) = 1.44, p = 0.23.  
 
3.3.2 IGCS Scores  
Problem gamblers scored higher on the IGSS than non-problem regular gamblers, and 
there was a significant main effect of problem gambling status on IGCS scores, F (1, 148) = 
140.65, p < .001. This supported hypothesis two, that problem gamblers would endorse more 
cognitions relating to the use of skilful play than non-problem regular gamblers. Similarly, in 
support of hypothesis five, skill-based gamblers scored higher on the IGCS than chance-
based gamblers and there was a significant main effect of gambling preference on IGCS, F 
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(1, 148) = 17.29, p < .001. The interaction between gambling severity and gambling 
preference on skill-related cognitions in the IGCS was significant, F (1, 148) = 6.61, p = 
0.01, which supports the sixth hypothesis and indicates that problem gamblers with a 
preference for skill-based activities were more likely to score highest on the IGCS and 
endorse skill-related cognitions.  
 
3.3.3 GCI Scores 
Problem gamblers scored higher than non-problem regular gamblers on skilled 
cognitions in the CGI and there was a significant main effect of problem gambling status on 
GCI scores, F (1, 148) = 39.03, p < .001. Skill-based gamblers endorsed more skill-related 
gambling cognitions and there was a significant main effect of gambling preference on GCI 
scores, F (1, 148) = 26.16, p < .001. These results supported hypotheses two and five. The 
sixth hypothesis, that problem gamblers with a preference for skilled games would score 
highest of all four groups on skill-based cognitions, was not supported for the GCI, as there 
was a non-significant interaction between gambling severity and gambling preference on 
skill-related cognitions in the GCI, F (1, 148) = .072 , p = .79.  
 
3.3.4 Knowledge of Odds Scores 
In support of hypothesis three, there was a non-significant main effect of problem 
gambler status on knowledge of odds scores, F (1, 148) = .36, p = .55, meaning there was no 
significant different between problem gamblers and non-problem regular gamblers in their 
knowledge of gambling odds. There was a non-significant main effect of gambling 
preference on knowledge of odds scores, F (1, 148) = 2.02, p = .16. The interaction between 
problem gambler status and gambling preference on knowledge of odds scores was not 
significant, F (1, 148) = .62, p = .43.  
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3.3.5 Numerical Reasoning 
Results showed that non-problem regular gamblers scored higher on the numerical 
reasoning test than problem gamblers, and there was a significant main effect of problem 
gambler status on numerical reasoning scores, F (1, 148) = 4.44, p = .04. This did not support 
hypothesis three which predicted there would be no difference between problem gamblers 
and non-problem gamblers on numerical reasoning scores. As shown in Table 3.6, gamblers 
who preferred skilled games scored higher on the numerical reasoning test than gamblers 
who preferred chance games, but this main effect was non-significant and did not support the 
fourth hypothesis, F (1, 148) = .39, p = .53. There was a significant interaction between 
problem gambler status and gambling preference on numerical reasoning skills, F (1, 148) = 
4.02 , p =.05, which indicates that non-problem gamblers with a preference for skill-based 
activities were more likely to score highest on numerical reasoning.  
 
3.3.6 CRT Scores  
As shown in Table 3.6, non-problem gamblers scored higher on the CRT than problem 
gamblers, and there was a significant main effect of problem gambler status on CRT scores, 
F (1, 148) = 5.02, p = .03. This did not support the third hypothesis that there would be no 
significant difference between groups. Although skill-based gamblers scored higher on the 
CRT, the fifth hypothesis was not supported as there was a non-significant main effect of 
gambling preference on CRT scores, F (1, 148) = .75, p = .39. Lastly, there was a non-
significant interaction between problem gambler status and gambling preference on CRT 
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Table 3.6 
Mean (SD) scores on the PGSI, GRCS, GCI, Knowledge of Odds, Numerical Reasoning, and 
CRT. 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 Skill Preference 
 (n = 67) 
Chance Preference 
(n = 85) 
Overall 


















(n = 152) 
 
M(SD) 





















































































PG = Problem Gambler; NPG = Non-Problem Regular Gambler; PGSI = Problem Gambling Severity Index; 
GRCS = Erroneous Cognitions; IGCS; Skill-Related Cognitions, CGI: Skill-Related Cognitions; CRT = 
Cognitive Reasoning Test  
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Table 3.7 
Two-Way ANOVA Results. 









GRCS 145.87 (.50)* 5.30 (.04)* 1.44 (.01) 
IGCS 140.65 (.49)* 17.29 (.11)* 6.61 (.04)* 
GCI 39.03 (.21)* 26.16 (.15)* .072 (.00) 
Knowledge of Odds .36 (.00) 2.02 (.01) .62 (.00) 
Numerical Reasoning  4.44 (.03)* .39 (.00) 4.02 (.03)* 
CRT 5.02 (.03)* .75 (.01) 1.50 (.01) 
GRCS = Erroneous Cognitions; IGCS; Skill-Related Cognitions, CGI: Skill-Related Cognitions; CRT = 
Cognitive Reasoning Test  
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CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION  
 
4.1 Overview of the Main Findings  
 
The present study aimed to support findings from previous research that problem 
gamblers would endorse more erroneous beliefs than non-problem regular gamblers, and that 
these groups would not differ on their level of numerical reasoning skill, (Lambos & 
Delfabbro, 2007). The present study also tested the assumption that skilled gamblers may 
endorse a wider range of cognitive beliefs relating to skilful play in gambling, and may have 
greater skills in mathematical reasoning than chance-based gamblers. Analysis of these 
relationships provided insight into the potential differences between gamblers depending on 
preference of gambling type (skill or chance) and what implications this might have for 
gambling-related cognitive therapy approaches. 
 
There was partial support for hypotheses one through six. Results supported 
hypotheses one and two, and problem gamblers were found to endorse more erroneous 
beliefs and report more cognitions relating to the skilful play than non-problem regular 
gamblers. The first component of the third hypothesis was supported; no significant 
difference was found between problem gamblers and non-problem regular gamblers in their 
understanding of common gambling odds. However, gambling severity was found to have a 
significant main effect on numerical reasoning skills, which did not support the third 
hypothesis. Hypothesis four was not supported, as gamblers with a preference for skilled 
games did not score more accurately than gamblers with a preference for chance games when 
assessed on mathematical reasoning. Hypothesis five was supported, and skill-based 
gamblers endorsed more cognitions relating to skilful play than chance-based gamblers. The 
final hypothesis was partially supported; problem gamblers with a preference for skill-based 
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activities scored highest of all groups on one measure of skill-based cognitions (IGCS) but 
not the other (GCI). 
 
4.2 Erroneous Beliefs and Skill-Related Cognitions  
 
The finding that problem gamblers endorsed more erroneous beliefs supports previous 
research where problem gamblers have typically reported higher levels of irrational beliefs 
and hold these beliefs with more conviction (Sevigny & Ladouceur, 2004; Ladouceur, 2004; 
Toplak et al, 2007; Delfabbro & Winefield, 2000; Griffiths, 1995; Walker, 1992a; Mysreth et 
al. 2010). This finding is consistent with cognitive theory for gambling which suggests that 
problem gamblers cannot comprehend the true nature of chance and randomness in gambling. 
These erroneous beliefs can be explained by Toplak et al’s (2007) theory of system failures in 
adaptive processing, where the analytical system fails to identify and correct irrational 
beliefs in the automatic interpretation of information. The present study also found that 
problem gamblers are more likely to report more skill-related cognitions than non-problem 
regular gamblers. This finding denotes that there is a perceived ideation of skill held by 
problem gamblers, whether or not the gambler partakes in skill or chance-based gambling. 
Gamblers therefore over-estimate how much skill can impact outcomes and ability to win.  
 
Skill-based gamblers were also found to endorse more cognitions relating to skilful 
play than chance-based gamblers. This provides sufficient evidence that there is a meaningful 
distinction between the cognitive biases contributing to gambling activities of skill and 
chance, and gamblers with a preference for skill-based activities have more conviction in the 
way in which their skills can impact the activity and control their gambling outcomes. Once 
again, this means skill can be over-estimated even in skill-based gambling where there is an 
element of genuine skill. This finding is linked to previous research where increased levels of 
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general gambling-related erroneous beliefs were found in activities that involved skill 
(Toneatto et al., 1997), and added an element of skill created a greater irrational sense of 
control in skill-based gamblers (Myrseth et al., 2010; Toneatto et al., 1997). This finding also 
supports Cantinotti et al. (2004) where skills of sports bettors were suggested to be 
manifested by irrational cognitive beliefs, rather than reflecting actual skill. 
 
As anticipated, skill-based problem gamblers endorsed the most skill-based 
cognitions on a skill-related cognition scale. This provides some evidence that there is a 
distinction between the four gambling groups and problem gamblers who gamble on skill 
endorse different cognitive beliefs to other gamblers. Hence, it suggests an explanation as to 
why skill-based problem gamblers continue to gamble despite adverse and financial 
consequences. It also suggests that skill-based problem gamblers justify their gambling 
decisions and choose to continue to gamble because they believe their level of skill is 
supporting their success.  
 
4.3 The role of Numerical Reasoning Ability in Erroneous Belief  
 
The present study also considered the role of numerical reasoning in different 
gambling groups. Findings that problem gamblers and non-problem regular gamblers did not 
differ in their understanding of common gambling odds confirmed previous research by 
Lambos & Delfabbro (2007) that both groups of gamblers display similar understanding of 
gambling odds and higher levels of irrational beliefs cannot be attributed to poorer statistical 
ability. However, gambling severity was found to have a significant main effect on numerical 
reasoning skills, where non-problem gambles were more accurate than problem gamblers, 
which is not consistent with predictions of the present study or previous research by Lambos 
and Delfabbro (2007). Findings also showed that skill-based gamblers were not more 
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accurate in numerical reasoning than chance-based gamblers. This did not support predictions 
of the present study and instead, contributes to disproving the assumption that skill-based 
gamblers have more numerical knowledge and are therefore more skilful gamblers. The 
findings did, however, show that skill-based gamblers had strong conviction in skill-related 
gambling cognitions. It may therefore be inferred that a combination of strong endorsement 
of skill-related cognitions and insignificant numerical skill leads to an overestimation of skill.   
 
4.4 Strengths and Limitations  
 
This study has a number of strengths. It is the first to consider and compare skill-
specific cognitive beliefs and numerical reasoning skill between skill-based and chance-based 
gamblers.  It also used empirically validated measures (PGSI, GRCS, Numerical Reasoning 
& CRT) as well as items (knowledge of odds questions) that had previously been used in 
significant experiential research.  The sample size for the study was suitable for the analyses 
undertaken and the study. Another important element was that all people were regular 
gamblers so that the study avoided the problem evident in studies that use non-gamblers or 
students as the lower risk comparison group. A failure to do this means that any differences 
observed for problem gamblers could be due to their experience with gambling (the regularity 
of playing) as well as their status as problem gamblers. (Orford, 1985). To avoid this 
confound, fortnightly gambling frequency was matched across the sample, for problem and 
non-problem gamblers.  
 
However, it is important to also acknowledge several limitations. Firstly, females 
were underrepresented across all sample groups, which is likely due to there being fewer 
female gamblers in the community, (Desai, Maciejewski, Pantalon & Potenza, 2005). In 
particular, males were much more prone to gambling on skill-based activities than females, 
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which is a common observation not only in gambling studies but also in the wider 
community, (Toneatto, 1997). Hence, some of the outcome measures (GRCS, CGI, 
knowledge of odds and numerical reasoning) suffered from gender differences, which may 
have had an effect on results and made some results more attributable to gender differences. 
It was also difficult to attain equal sample sizes of problem and non-problem gamblers, 
meaning the non-problem group had increased numbers in both the skilled and chance 
sample. Skilled gamblers were also slightly underrepresented compared to chance. It is also 
important to consider that the measures assessing cognitive biases and erroneous beliefs 
(GRCS, IGCS & GCI) were all answered in a self-report manner. As per all self-report 
measures, this format makes it challenging to ascertain true beliefs, as participants are likely 
to respond in a way that is socially desirable, and in this case, in a way that reflects positive, 
rational decision-making. Lastly, it is important to consider that many respondents engaged 
in multiple forms of gambling over the previous twelve months. Results were based on the 
type of gambling they engaged in most frequently; however, it is difficult to know whether 
participants answered questions thinking about their involvement in skill or chance activities 
when questioned about their beliefs.  
 
4.5 Implications on Gambling-Related Cognitive Therapy  
 
Due to the rising involvement in skill-based gambling over the last decade and an 
increasing demand for appropriate and effective treatment services for problem gamblers who 
gamble on skill-based activities, an important aim of the present study was to assess the 
suitability of current cognitive therapy techniques for skill-based problem gamblers. As 
discussed above, the results of the present study propose that skill-based problem gamblers 
believe they are skilful and their skills assist in their rewards. Hence, it is arguable that 
current therapy approaches centred around challenging erroneous believes about randomness 
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and probabilities may be less effective for this group and therefore require further 
development. This would need to include content that is more applicable to gambling that 
involves an element of skill. Suggestions for modifications to cognitive approaches could 
include an approach that focuses on challenging the cognitive and arguably irrational beliefs 
relating to skill and the deterministic actions of skill-based gamblers.  
 
4.6 Future Directions  
 
 This research suggests that certain clusters of beliefs exist within skill-based gambling 
groups, which could be a focus for further research and application in clinical practice.  A 
replication study using a more equally balanced sample of skill and chance-based gamblers 
would assist to confirm the findings of the present study relating to gambling severity, 
gambling type, erroneous beliefs, skill-related beliefs and numerical reasoning. Replication 
could also control for gender effects.  
 
Future research in the field of skill-related cognitions and numerical reasoning ability 
could expand on the results of the present study, using the skill-related cognitions identified 
in the present study. Further research could include the development of measures that assess 
success or reward in skill based gambling against skill related cognitions, to allow for 
genuine skill levels to be assessed. Furthermore, it has been previously suggested (Smith, 
2003) that differences in cognitive beliefs between problem and non-problem gamblers may 
actually reflect more subtle fallacies about probabilities and statistics, which are not 
identified by the types of questions used in current research, which suggests the need for 
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4.7 Conclusions  
The present study confirmed that erroneous gambling-related and specific skill-related 
cognitions are higher in problem gamblers and skill-based gamblers. It also confirmed that 
differences between problem and other gamblers is unlikely to be due to differences in 
understanding of gambling odds and that differences in numerical reasoning does not appear 
to relate to perceptions of skill in skill-based gamblers. These findings emphasise the 
importance of considering differences in gambling type when examining the maintenance of 
problem gambling and the need to adapt cognitive therapy to better suit those who gamble on 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Measures 
Demographics  
 
Q1 Have you gambled in the past two weeks? 
o Yes  
o No  
 
Q4 Please select your gender  
o Male  
o Female  
o Other  
 
 
Q5 What is your age? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
Q6 In the last 12 months, what type of gambling did you most frequently engaged in? 
o Horse/Greyhound Racing  
o Sports Betting  
o Gaming Machines (i.e. Pokies)  
o Casino Table Games  
o Card Games  
o Lottery Products  
o Keno  
o Internet Gambling  
o Private Gambling  
o Other (please specify) ________________________________________________ 
 



























Racing  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Sports Betting  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Gaming Machines 
(i.e. Pokies)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Casino Table 
Games  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Card Games  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Lottery Products  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Keno  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Internet Gambling  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
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Q8 On which of the following types of gambling did you spend the most money in the 
last 12 months? 
o Horse/Greyhound Racing  
o Sports Betting  
o Gaming Machines (i.e. Pokies)  
o Casino Table Games  
o Card Games  
o Lottery Products  
o Keno  
o Internet Gambling  
o Private Gambling  
o Other (please specify) ________________________________________________ 
 
  
  57 
Problem Gambling Severity Index (PGSI)  
 
Please tick the appropriate box for each question below. 
 Never Sometimes 
Most of the 
time 
Almost always 
When you think 
of the past 12 
months, have 
you bet more 
than you could 
really afford to 
lose?  
o  o  o  o  
Still thinking 










o  o  o  o  
When you 
gambled, did 
you go back 
another day to 
try win back 
the money you 
lost?  
o  o  o  o  
Have you 
borrowed 
money or sold 
anything to get 
money to 
gamble?  
o  o  o  o  
Have you felt 
that you might 
have a problem 
with gambling?  
o  o  o  o  
Has gambling 




o  o  o  o  
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or anxiety?  
Have people 
criticised your 
betting or told 
you that you 
had a gambling 
problem, 
regardless of 
whether or not 
you thought it 
was true?  






you or your 
household?  
o  o  o  o  
Have you felt 
guilty about the 
way you 
gamble or what 
happens when 
you gamble?  
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Gambling Related Cognition Scale (GRCS) 
Q9 For each of the following statements, please mark the response that most closely 































o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Praying 
helps me 
win  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  





I will start 
to win  








help me to 
win  





o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
It is difficult 
to stop 
gambling as 
I am so out 
of control  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Certain 
numbers o  o  o  o  o  o  o  




of winning  





me to win 
next time  





due to ‘bad 
luck’ or ‘bad 
circumstanc
es’  





o  o  o  o  o  o  o  












o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
When I win 
once, it is a 
definite sign 
I will win 
again  







o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
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Gambling 
helps me to 
reduce my 
stress levels  













o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
I only 
gamble 
when I feel 
lucky  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Rememberi




o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
I will never 
be able to 
stop 
gambling  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
I can predict 
when I am 
going to win  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
I am more 
likely to win 







than if I 
change 
them  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
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Internet Gaming Cognition Scale (IGCS) 
 
Q10 For each of the following statements, please mark the response that most closely 
reflects your thoughts about your gambling: 
 Do Not Agree Agree Strongly Agree 
When I make 
mistakes, lose 
progress, or fail in 
gambling, I must try 
again.  
o  o  o  
It would be a waste 
to stop gambling 
when I have already 
invested so much 
time and energy.   
o  o  o  
Rewards in 
gambling are as 
important to me as 
anything else in my 
life.  
o  o  o  
When I have a goal 
or objective in 
gambling, I must 
complete it as soon 
as possible.  
o  o  o  
I am proud of my 
gambling 
achievements.  o  o  o  
I spend time 
planning or thinking 
about gambling 
when I am not 
gambling.  
o  o  o  
People who do not 
gamble do not really 
understand an 
important part of 
who I am.  
o  o  o  
It is important to me 
that I am better at 
gambling than other 
people (e.g. more 
skilful, higher 
returns).  
o  o  o  
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Other gamblers 
admire and respect 
my gambling skills.  o  o  o  
I feel more in 
control when I 
gamble.  o  o  o  
If I complete or 
master an 
achievement, skill or 
goal in gambling, I 
feel good about 
myself.   
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Gambling Cognitions Inventory (GCI)  
 
Q11 For each of the following statements, please mark the response that most closely 









I am a very 
skilled 
gambler.  o  o  o  o  
I can analyse 
my wins to give 
me strategies 
to make me a 
better gambler.  
o  o  o  o  




o  o  o  o  
I will get better 
at gambling 





more money I 
expect to win.  
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Knowledge of Odds 
 
Q12 In Cross-lotto on TV, there are 45 numbers and you must choose 6. Imagine if half 
of the people in Australia bought a ticket (that’s 10 million people) each with one set of 
6 numbers. How many people do you think would either win or share the big prize by 
guessing all 6 numbers correctly? (Please choose one response). 
o One person out of every 100,000 people  
o Only one person in every million people  
o Only one person in every 5 million people  
o Only one person in every 8 million people  
o Fewer than one person in every 10 million people  
 
 
Q14 If you throw two coins, what are the chances of getting two heads? 
 
o 30%  
o 25%  
o 50%  
o 45%  
o 10%  
 
Q15 If a poker machine returns 87% to the player and a person plays $20 through the 
machine, what is the typical amount they would expect to lose? 
o $8.70  
o $3.30  
o $2.60  
o $1.30  
o $4.50  
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Q16 If a deck of 52 cards is shuffled and a card is drawn. What are the chances that it is 
an ace? 
o 2 in 52  
o 4 in 52  
o 1 in 52  
o 4 in 26  
o None of the above  
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This test is designed to assess your ability to understand numbers and the relationships 
between numbers. 
 
Each question has six possible answers. One and only one is correct in each case. 
 
You now have a chance to complete the four example questions below in order to make 
sure that you understand the test.  
 
Please attempt the following example questions now. 
 
Q20           2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12… What number comes next?   
o 8  
o 9  
o 11  
o 12  
o 14  
o 16  
 
Q25 Which of the following is the odd one out?  
o 2/4  
o 6/8  
o 3/6  
o 4/9  
o 4/8  
o 2/6  
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Q26 1 is to 10 as 10 is to…? 
o 10  
o 100  
o 99  
o 98  
o 97  
o 96  
 
 
Q23 There are a total of 25 questions below. Please aim to complete the test 
in under 10 minutes. Time is short, so when you begin the test work as quickly 
and as accurately as you can.  
 
 
Q24 A clock gains 4 seconds every 24 hours. If it is correct at 8pm on Sunday how many 
seconds will it be fast at 8pm on the following Thursday? 
o 16  
o 12.5  
o 14  
o 12  
o 18  
o 16.5  
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Q28 ¼ is to .25 as ⅗ is to…? 
o .3  
o .6  
o .16  
o .33  
o .66  
o .06  
 
Q29 If the original price of an item in a sale was £10.50p and this price was reduced by 
20% for the sale, what is the price in the sale? 
o £10.10  
o £7.30  
o £9.45  
o £8.40  
o £9.40  
o £8.30  
 
Q30 If there are $1.50 dollars to the pound (£), how man dollars would you get for £8? 
o $6  
o $4  
o $10  
o $10.50  
o $12  
o $12.50  
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Q31 8 is to 0 as 18 is to…? 
o 10  
o 12  
o 2  
o 16  
o 8  
o 6  
 
Q32 7 is to 5 as 12 is to…? 
o 7  
o 14  
o 10  
o 13  
o 9  
o 11  
 
Q33 If it takes 20 seconds for a machine to fill three bottles of milk, how many bottles 
will it fill in three minutes? 
o 21  
o 18  
o 27  
o 12  
o 28  
o 15  
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Q34 1.08, 2.16, 3.24, 4.32, 5.4, 6.48… What number comes next? 
o 6.56  
o 6.66  
o 7.56  
o 7.58  
o 7.66  
o 7.76  
 
Q35 Which of the following is the odd one out? 
o 6  
o 9  
o 12  
o 24  
o 8  
o 16  
 
Q36 1, 2, 4, 7, 11, 16,… What number comes next? 
o 18  
o 24  
o 23  
o 19  
o 22  
o 21  
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Q37 If New York is five hours behind London and Los Angeles is three hours behind 
New York, what time is it in Los Angeles when it is 1pm in London? 
o 8pm  
o 6pm  
o 8am  
o 9am  
o 10am  
o 5am  
 
Q38 1.09, 1.2, 1.31, 1.42,… What number comes next?                    
o 1.5  
o 1.55  
o 1.53  
o 2.53  
o 1.44  
o 1.54  
 
Q39 If New York is five hours behind London and a plane leaves London at 12.05 (local 
time) and arrives at New York at 12.17 (local time), how long does the flight take in 
hours and minutes?  
o 4hr 12min  
o 5hr 12min  
o 5hr 22min  
o 4hr 22min  
o 5hr 48min  
o 4hr 48min  
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Q40 18 is to 6 as 12 is to…?                  
o 3  
o 6  
o 2  
o 5  
o 4  
o 8  
Q42 7⁄3 is to 1⁄3 as 7 is to…? 
o 1⁄7  
o 2⁄7  
o 1  
o 3⁄7  
o ½  
o 2  
 
Q43 A train left London at 10.15pm and arrived in Aberdeen at 6.12am. How long did 
the journey take? 
o 8hr 3min  
o 7hr 3min  
o 7hr 57min  
o 8hr 57min  
o 7hr 55min  
o 6hr 55min  
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Q44 A car travelled at an average speed at 30km/hr for the first three hours of a four 
hour journey. The journey was 140km. What was the average speed for the last hour? 
o 50km/hr  
o 60km/hr  
o 20km/hr  
o 55km/hr  
o 70km/hr  
o 90km/hr  
Q45 3.8, 4.88, 5.96, 7.04,… What comes next? 
o 8.24  
o 9.12  
o 0.04  
o 8.12  
o 8.88  
o 9.24  
 
Q47 Which of the following is the odd one out? 
o 1.2  
o 2.2  
o 1.3  
o 1.8  
o 2.6  
o 1.6  
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Q48 3, 5, 8, 13, 21, 34,… What number comes next?                  
o 55  
o 49  
o 47  
o 56  
o 39  
o 42  
 
Q49 1.2 is to .56 as .56 is to…? 
o .26  
o .36  
o .28  
o .16  
o .18  
o .42  
 
Q50 5000, 1000, 200, 40,… What comes next? 
o 5  
o 25  
o 7  
o 35  
o 8  
o 9  
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Q51 13 is to 169 as 11 is to…? 
o 122  
o 121  
o 212  
o 112  
o 111  
o 221  
 
Q52 There is £32.34 in petty cash. The secretary need to buy three bottles of correcting 
fluid at 30p each, and a new note pad at 42p, how much cash will there be left? 
o £31.30  
o £31.32  
o £30.92  
o £32.02  
o £31.02  
o £31.12  
 
Q53 2, 2, 2, 2, 4, 4, 4, 8, 8,… What comes next? 
o 8  
o 7  
o 16  
o 15  
o 32  
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Cognitive Reflection Test 
 
Q54 A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How 





Q55 If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 





Q56 In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 
48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to 
cover half of the lake? 
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Q57  
Thank you for participating in this study.   
    
Your participation is greatly appreciated. If participation in this study has caused any 
concern for you, please call the Gambling Helpline on 1800 858 858 or visit Gambling 
Help Online.    
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Appendix B: Email & Letter Invitation to Participants - PsychMed 
 
Email 





You are being invited to participate in a research project conducted by Elizabeth McCarron, 
Practice Manager at PsychMed Payneham.  This research will form the basis for the degree 
of Bachelor of Psychological Science (Honours) at the University of Adelaide under the 
supervision of Professor Paul Delfabbro.  This research will be conducted in collaboration 
with PsychMed Pty Ltd.  
 
This research project aims to explore the beliefs that gamblers have about gambling and 
whether these differ depending on the style of gambling they engage in. For example, how do 
people understand probability, skill, chance and the meaning of events that occur in 
gambling.  
 
You are being invited as you have previously engaged or are currently engaging in the South 
Australian Intensive Gambling Help Service at PsychMed.  
 
You are invited to participate in an online survey containing a number of measures relating to 
gambling. The survey will ask questions about your thoughts on gambling as well as some 
mathematical odds and reasoning questions.  
 
The survey will take approximately 20-30 minutes to complete and you will receive a $20 
Myer E-Gift Card as compensation for your time and effort.  
 
To participate in this study, please click the link below and you will be redirected to more 
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Posted Letter 
11th July 2018  
 
Dear ******,  
 
You are being invited to participate in a research project conducted by Elizabeth McCarron, Practice Manager 
at PsychMed Payneham.  This research will form the basis for the degree of Bachelor of Psychological Science 
(Honours) at the University of Adelaide under the supervision of Professor Paul Delfabbro.  This research will 
be conducted in collaboration with PsychMed Pty Ltd.  
 
This research project aims to explore the beliefs that gamblers have about gambling and whether these differ 
depending on the style of gambling they engage in. For example, how do people understand probability, skill, 
chance and the meaning of events that occur in gambling.  
 
You are being invited as you have previously engaged or are currently engaging in the South Australian 
Intensive Gambling Help Service at PsychMed.  
 
You are invited to participate in an online survey containing a number of measures relating to gambling. The 
survey will ask questions about your thoughts on gambling as well as some mathematical odds and reasoning 
questions.  
 
The survey will take approximately 20-30 minutes to complete and you will receive a $20 Myer E-Gift Card as 
compensation for your time and effort.  
 




This link will direct you to more information about the study before beginning the survey.   
 
Alternatively, please email elizabeth.mccarron@student.adelaide.edu.au or call Elizabeth on 0414 188 360 to 
have a direct link sent to your email address.  
 
Any questions about the project may be directed to Prof Paul Delfabbro (08 83134936 or 





Practice Manager, PsychMed Payneham  
B. Arts (Psychology) B. Laws  
B. Psychological Science (Hons) cont. 
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Appendix C: Participant Information Sheet  
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
PROJECT TITLE: Gambling beliefs in skilled and chance-based 
gambling 
HUMAN RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE APPROVAL NUMBER: 
 
PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: Professor Paul Delfabbro  
STUDENT RESEARCHER: Elizabeth McCarron  
STUDENT’S DEGREE: Bachelor of Psychological Science (Honours)  
Dear Participant,  
You are invited to participate in the research project described below. 
What is the project about?  
This research project aims to explore the beliefs that gamblers have about gambling and 
whether these differ depending on the style of gambling they engage in. For example, how do 
people understand probability, skill, chance and the meaning of events that occur in gambling. 
Who is undertaking the project?  
This project is being conducted by Elizabeth McCarron. This research will form the basis for the 
degree of Bachelor of Psychological Science (Honours) at the University of Adelaide under the 
supervision of Professor Paul Delfabbro.  This research will be conducted in collaboration with 
PsychMed Pty Ltd.  
Why am I being invited to participate?   
(For PsychMed Participants): You are being invited as you have previously engaged or are 
currently engaging in the South Australian Intensive Gambling Help Service at PsychMed.  
 
(For Qualtics participants): You are being invited as you identify as having some regular (at 
least fortnightly) experience gambling on activities that might involve skill or chance. 
What am I being invited to do? 
You are being invited to participate in an online survey containing a number of measures 
relating to gambling. The survey will ask questions about your thoughts on gambling as well as 
some mathematical odds and reasoning questions.  
 
(For PsychMed Participants): You will receive a $20 Coles-Myer gift card as compensation for 
your time and effort.  
 
How much time will my involvement in the project take?   
The online survey will take approximately 15 minutes to complete.  
Are there any risks associated with participating in this project? 
The survey will ask some questions relating to gambling habits and behaviour. If participation 
in this study causes any concern for you, please call the Gambling Helpline on 1800 858 858 or 
visit Gambling Help Online. Free, confidential and professional counselling and therapy for 
individuals, couples, family and friends is available at one of the many Gambling Help Services 
across the State, please call 1800 858 858. Further help is available free of charge at the SA 
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Intensive Gambling Help Service (SAIGHS) provided by PsychMed for gamblers and those 
affected by gambling, please call 8232 3333 or visit PsychMed’s website.  
What are the potential benefits of the research project? 
Your participation in this project may contribute to our understanding on the effect that 
gambling style has on gambling cognitions. It may also contribute to the body of research 
concerning effective therapy techniques for gambling. Please be aware there may be no 
immediate benefits to you if you participate in this study.   
Can I withdraw from the project? 
Participation in this project is completely voluntary. If you agree to participate, you can 
withdraw from the study at any time up until the submission of the survey.  
What will happen to my information? 
Your privacy and confidentiality will be protected in your participation in this study. Your 
personal information will be removed and replaced with a code. With your consent, we may 
access your results on a previous assessment conducted at PsychMed. This measures is the 
Problem Gambling Severity Index.  
 
Data from this data will be kept anonymously in a secure storage room for 5 years, but none of it 
will be individually identifiable. 
 
The information gained from this project will be published in a University Honours Degree 
thesis. You will not be identified in this publication and only summary data will be published.  If 
you would like to receive a copy of the final report, please provide an email address in the final 
question of this survey.    
  
Your information will only be used as described in this participant information sheet and it will only 
be disclosed according to the consent provided, except as required by law.   
Who do I contact if I have questions about the project? 
Any questions about the project may be directed to Prof Paul Delfabbro (08 83134936 or 
paul.delfabbro@adelaide.edu.au) or Elizabeth McCarron 
(elizabeth.mccarron@student.adelaide.edu.au). 
For any questions about the ethical conduct of the research, please contact Dr. 
Diana Dorstyn, Acting Chair of the Human Research Subcommittee in the School 
of Psychology (Diana.Dorstyn@adelaide.edu.au). 
If I want to participate, what do I do? 
To participate in this study, please read the consent form on the next page and click accept if 






Elizabeth McCarron     Prof Paul Delfabbro 
B. Arts (Psychology) B. Laws    PhD., B.A. (Hons), B.Ec. 
B. Psychological Science (Hons) cont. 
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Appendix D: Consent Form  
 
Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) 
CONSENT FORM 
1. I have read the attached Information Sheet and agree to take part in the following 
research project: 




2. I have had the project, so far as it affects me, and the potential risks and burdens fully 
explained to my satisfaction by the research worker. I have had the opportunity to ask 
any questions I may have about the project and my participation. My consent is given 
freely. 
3. Although I understand the purpose of the research project, it has also been explained 
that my involvement may not be of any benefit to me. 
4. I agree to participate in the activities outlined in the participant information sheet. 
5. I understand that I am free to withdraw from the project at any time up until the 
submission of the survey.  
6. I have been informed that the information gained in the project will be published in a 
University Honours Degree thesis. 
7. I have been informed that in the published materials I will not be identified and my 
personal results will not be divulged. 
8. My information will only be used for the purpose of this research project and it will only 
be disclosed according to the consent provided, except where disclosure is required by 
law.   
9. I am aware that I should keep a copy of both the Information Page and this Consent 
Form. 
 
If you consent these terms, please tick the box below and proceed to the survey.   
 I consent to the above terms.  
 
 
